

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TEL AV 11128 01 OF 04 291048Z  
ACTION NEA-07

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EUR-08 IO-06 SSM-01 NSCE-00  
INR-05 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 PM-03 DODE-00 SP-02 L-01  
H-01 PA-01 ACDA-10 SAA-01 SES-01 NEAE-00 SSO-00  
INRE-00 /062 W

-----002516 291139Z /12

O 291017Z AUG 78  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5185  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
USMISSION SINAI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 11128

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PBOR, PDEV, MOPS, IS  
SUBJECT: ISRAEL'S SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK: HOW MUCH  
GIVE IS THERE?

1. SUMMARY: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SETTLEMENTS TO ISRAEL  
LIES PRINCIPALLY IN THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO ISRAEL'S CASE  
FOR RETAINING PERMANENT CONTROL OVER PORTIONS OF THE  
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, RATHER THAN IN ANY IMMEDIATE MILI-  
TARY ROLE. FOR A DECADE, ISRAEL LIMITED ITS SETTLEMENTS  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 11128 01 OF 04 291048Z

MAINLY TO AREAS OF MAJOR STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE, I.E.,  
THE JORDAN VALLEY, THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, AND THE RAFAH  
APPROACHES. UNDER THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT, WHOSE TERRITORIAL  
ASPIRATIONS ARE BASED ON NATIONALISTIC AS WELL AS SECURITY  
GROUNDS, NEW SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY HAS BEEN CONCENTRATED IN  
THE SAMARIAN HIGHLANDS, WHICH PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS HAD EX-  
PLICITLY AVOIDED. MOST ISRAELIS STILL THINK OF SETTLE-

MENTS PRIMARILY IN SECURITY TERMS AND HAVE NOT DEVELOPED MANY EMOTIONAL TIES TO THE NEW HIGHLAND WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS.

2. BEGIN'S ENTHUSIASM FOR ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS "EVERYWHERE" ON THE WEST BANK, HAS BEEN TEMPERED BY RESPONSIBILITY AND THE WEIGHT OF WORLD OPINION, AND SINCE THE SEPTEMBER-FEBRUARY BURST OF ACTIVITY IN SAMARIA, NO NEW SETTLEMENTS HAVE GONE UP ANYWHERE. TO ACHIEVE A FAR-REACHING AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT, BEGIN MAY BE WILLING TO AGREE TO A FREEZE ON NEW SETTLEMENTS DURING THE "INTERIM" PERIOD, PROVIDING EXISTING SETTLEMENTS CAN BE EXPANDED AND ISRAELIS ALLOWED TO PURCHASE LAND PRIVATELY.

3. OVER THE LONG TERM, THE FUTURE OF THE SETTLEMENTS WILL BE DETERMINED BY THE SHAPE OF ISRAEL'S FINAL BORDERS AND NOT VICE VERSA. ISRAEL WILL PROBABLY INSIST ON RETAINING PORTIONS OF THOSE AREAS IT DEFINES AS STRATEGICALLY INDISPENSABLE, AND WITHIN THOSE AREAS THE SETTLEMENTS CAN BE EXPECTED TO REMAIN. IF ISRAEL CAN EVENTUALLY BE PERSUADED TO WITHDRAW FROM MOST OF THE WEST BANK UNDER A "TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE," WE BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENCE OF SETTLEMENTS IN THE EVACUATED AREAS WILL NOT PRESENT AN INSUPERABLE OBSTACLE. SINCE THE ISSUE IN THOSE CASES WILL BE SENTIMENT AND NOT SECURITY, WE BELIEVE THE ISRAELI PUBLIC WILL ACCEPT AN ARRANGEMENT UNDER WHICH SOME

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 TEL AV 11128 01 OF 04 291048Z

SETTLEMENTS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN, WHILE OTHERS AT EMOTIONALLY SIGNIFICANT SITES COULD REMAIN, EVEN UNDER FOREIGN SOVEREIGNTY. END SUMMARY

4. INCIDENT TO OUR PREPARATIONS FOR CAMP DAVID, WE HAVE OF COURSE BEEN THINKING ABOUT THE SETTLEMENTS QUESTION. SPECIFICALLY, WHAT ARE THE GENUINE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS INFLUENCING ISRAEL'S SETTLEMENTS POLICY AND HOW NEGOTIABLE ARE THEY? WE HAVE REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SETTLEMENTS' PRIMARY IMPORTANCE IN SECURITY TERMS LIES NOT IN A TACTICAL ROLE OF PROVIDING EARLY WARNING, DETERRING INFILTRATION, OR REPELLING INVADERS, AS IS COMMONLY ASSERTED. RATHER, THEY AFFORD A POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL RATIONALE FOR RETAINING A PERMANENT STRATEGIC PRESENCE FOR REGULAR ISRAELI MILITARY FORCES IN THE AREAS IN WHICH THEY ARE LOCATED. IN OTHER WORDS, MOST ISRAELIS ARE CONVINCED THAT THEIR SECURITY REQUIRES PERMANENT MILITARY CONTROL OF SIGNIFICANT PORTIONS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, AND THEY BELIEVE, ON THE BASIS OF ZIONIST EXPERIENCE IN PRE-1948 PALESTINE WHEN SETTLEMENTS OFTEN DEFINED THE EVENTUAL BOUNDARIES OF THE STATE, THAT THE PRESENCE OF ISRAELI SETTLERS IN THOSE AREAS GREATLY

FACILITATES ACHIEVEMENT OF THAT GOAL.

5. IT MUST BE NOTED AT THE OUTSET THAT THE OFFICIAL PHILOSOPHY REGARDING SETTLEMENTS, AS FAR AS THE MOST SENSITIVE AREA -- THE WEST BANK -- IS CONCERNED, UNDERWENT A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE WITH THE ADVENT OF THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT. DURING THE FIRST DECADE OF THE OCCUPATION, UNDER A SERIES OF LABOR GOVERNMENTS, THE OFFICIAL -- AND BY AND LARGE STRAIGHT-FORWARD -- RATIONALE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SETTLEMENTS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WAS THEIR PURPORTED SECURITY FUNCTIONS. THUS, THE FIRST SETTLEMENTS WERE MOSTLY SET UP AND POPULATED BY ACTIVE-DUTY SOLDIERS, ORGANIZED INTO "NAHAL" UNITS IN OSTENSIBLY NON-PERMANENT INSTALLATIONS. FAIRLY QUICKLY, HOWEVER, THEY BEGAN TO  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 TEL AV 11128 01 OF 04 291048Z

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TEL AV 11128 02 OF 04 291056Z  
ACTION NEA-07

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EUR-08 IO-06 SSM-01 NSCE-00  
INR-05 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 PM-03 DODE-00 SP-02 L-01  
H-01 PA-01 ACDA-10 SAA-01 SES-01 NEAE-00 SSO-00  
INRE-00 /062 W

-----002578 291139Z /12

O 291017Z AUG 78

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5186

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

USMISSION SINAI

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 04 TEL AVIV 11128

LIMDIS

SHED BOTH THEIR MILITARY TRAPPINGS AND THEIR IMPERMANENT STATUS. THE SETTLEMENTS WERE CONCENTRATED, UNDER THE NEVER-OFFICIALLY-ADOPTED ALLON PLAN, IN THE JORDAN VALLEY, THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AND THE RAFAH APPROACHES -- AREAS THAT ISRAEL BELIEVED ITS SECURITY NEEDS DICTATED MUST BE PERMANENTLY RETAINED. EXPLICITLY EXCLUDED FROM THIS PATTERN WAS THE DENSELY POPULATED HEARTLAND OF THE WEST BANK, OUT OF CONCERN NOT TO PERMANENTLY INCORPORATE LARGE NUMBERS OF HOSTILE ARABS INTO ISRAEL. WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS, THIS PATTERN HELD UNTIL MAY 1977.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 11128 02 OF 04 291056Z

6. TO THE LIKUD, HOWEVER, SETTLEMENTS WERE IMPORTANT NOT ONLY FOR SECURITY REASONS BUT, EQUALLY IMPORTANTLY, AS A CONCRETE MANIFESTATION OF THE RELIGIOUS AND HISTORICAL RIGHT OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE TO LIVE THROUGHOUT ERETZ YISRAEL. (ATTACHMENT TO BELIEF IN THIS RIGHT IS, OF COURSE, NOT LIMITED TO THE LIKUD, AND MOST ISRAELIS WOULD INSIST THAT THE RIGHT OF JEWS AS INDIVIDUALS TO PURCHASE LAND AND LIVE IN THE WEST BANK BE ENSHRINED IN ANY PEACE AGREEMENT. BUT PREVIOUS GOVERNMENTS DID NOT REGARD EITHER SETTLEMENTS IN THE HEARTLAND OR ITS PERMANENT ISRAELI OCCUPATION AS NECESSARY TO SECURE THIS RIGHT.) THEREFORE, AMONG THE FIRST ACTS OF THE NEW LIKUD GOVERNMENT WAS ITS RENUNCIATION OF LABOR'S PALE-OF-SETTLEMENT POLICY, AND WITHIN EIGHT MONTHS, A DOZEN SETTLEMENTS HAD BEEN HASTILY ESTABLISHED IN SAMARIA WITH THE COLLABORATION OF GUSH EMUNIM. TO MENAHEM BEGIN AND HIS FOLLOWERS, SETTLEMENTS ARE NOT JUST A MEANS TO AN END - SECURITY; THEY ARE AN END IN THEMSELVES. HENCE, IT MAY BE ACADEMIC UNDER THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT TO TRY TO DRAW DISTINCTIONS IN TERMS OF EXPENDABILITY BETWEEN, SAY, SETTLEMENTS IN SAMARIA AND THOSE IN THE JORDAN VALLEY. IN STRATEGIC TERMS, THE SETTLEMENTS IN THE VALLEY ARE CLEARLY MORE IMPORTANT - OR ARE AT LEAST WIDELY REGARDED AS SUCH; BUT IN THE EMOTIONAL AND NATIONALISTIC TERMS IMPORTANT TO THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP, THE NEW SETTLEMENTS IN THE HIGHLANDS ARE PROBABLY OF EQUAL SIGNIFICANCE.

7. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THAT -- IF (A VERY BIG IF) IT COULD BRING ITSELF TO DO SO -- THIS GOVERNMENT COULD EASILY GAIN POPULAR ACCEPTANCE OF A FREEZE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK, IF THIS WAS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE A FAR-REACHING AGREEMENT WITH

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 TEL AV 11128 02 OF 04 291056Z

EGYPT.

8. BEGIN IS STILL PUBLICLY TREATING SETTLEMENTS AS A NON-NEGOTIABLE ISSUE; ONLY A FEW DAYS AGO HE TOLD A LIKUD AUDIENCE THAT IF A DEMAND WAS MADE OF HIM AT CAMP DAVID TO REMOVE SETTLEMENTS, THERE WOULD BE NO AGREEMENT. NONETHELESS, HIS PRACTICE OVER THE LAST YEAR HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLY MORE PRAGMATIC THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN SUGGESTED BY EITHER THE LIKUD ELECTORAL PLATFORM OR HIS EUPHORIC POST-ELECTION EXCLAMATION AT ELON MOREH (QADUM) THAT "THERE WILL BE MANY MORE" SUCH SETTLEMENTS. IN FACT, SINCE THE BURST OF ACTIVITY BETWEEN LAST SEPTEMBER AND FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR, DURING WHICH PERIOD ABOUT TWELVE NEW SETTLEMENTS WERE ESTABLISHED IN SAMARIA, NOT A SINGLE NEW SETTLEMENT ANYWHERE HAS BEEN SET UP OR EVEN DEFINITELY AUTHORIZED. WHILE THE REASONS FOR THIS MAY HAVE AS MUCH TO DO WITH BUDGETARY AND MANPOWER LIMITATIONS AS WITH A CONSCIOUS POLICY OF RESTRAINT, THE FACT IS THAT A DE FACTO MORATORIUM ON NEW SETTLEMENTS HAS BEEN IN EFFECT FOR HALF A YEAR, ALTHOUGH WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY OFFICIAL DECISION TO THIS EFFECT. ALTHOUGH WORKERS ARE BUSILY "THICKENING" EXISTING SETTLEMENTS ALL OVER THE WEST BANK, GUSH EMUNIM AND SOME HERUT HARDLINERS HAVE SHARPLY CRITICIZED BEGIN FOR TALKING MORE ABOUT SETTLEMENTS THAN DOING ANYTHING ABOUT THEM.

9. BEGIN CONTINUES TO INSIST ON ISRAEL'S INALIENABLE RIGHT TO ESTABLISH SETTLEMENTS, BECAUSE TO DO ANY LESS AT THIS POINT WOULD PROBABLY BE, IN HIS EYES, TO CONCEDE THAT SETTLEMENTS ARE JUST ANOTHER OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS OVER WHICH NEGOTIATIONS WILL TAKE PLACE, RATHER THAN THE LOGICAL FULFILLMENT OF THE MAXIMAL REVISIONIST ZIONIST PROGRAM HE HAS PURSUED RELENTLESSLY FOR FORTY YEARS. THERE IS NO SIGN THAT HE IS READY TO MAKE SUCH A

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TEL AV 11128 03 OF 04 291105Z  
ACTION NEA-07

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EUR-08 IO-06 SSM-01 NSCE-00

INR-05 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 PM-03 DODE-00 SP-02 L-01  
H-01 PA-01 ACDA-10 SAA-01 SES-01 NEAE-00 SSO-00  
INRE-00 /062 W

-----002643 291140Z /12

O 291017Z AUG 78  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5187  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
USMISSION SINAI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 TEL AVIV 11128

LIMDIS

CONCESSION.

10. IT IS CONCEIVABLE, HDWEVER, THAT HE COULD BE PERSUAD-  
ED, IN THE CONTEXT OF A FULL-SCALE AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT ON  
SINAI, TO AGREE TO A FORMAL MORATORIUM ON NEW WEST BANK  
AND GAZA SETTLEMENTS DURING THE FIVE-YEAR "INTERIM" PERIOD,  
PROVIDED THAT THE PRESENT SITES COULD CONTINUE TO RECEIVE  
SETTLERS AND THE RIGHT OF JEWS TO ACQUIRE LAND PRIVATELY  
UNDER THE AUTONOMY PLAN WAS ASSURED. ALTHOUGH IT IS UN-  
LIKELY SUCH A CONCESSION WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 11128 03 OF 04 291105Z

ARAB DEMANDS FOR THE LIQUIDATION OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS,  
IT WOULD BE SEEN HERE - AS ARIK SHARON HAS ANXIOUSLY IN-  
TIMATED - AS FIXING THE HIGH-WATER MARK IN ISRAEL'S  
CAMPAIGN TO SETTLE THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. ALTHOUGH IT  
COULD BE DEFENDED DOMESTICALLY AS NOT FORECLOSING ANY  
OPTIONS, THE FACT IS THAT ONCE HAVING AGREED TO SUCH A  
MORATORIUM IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR ISRAEL TO IN-  
AUGURATE NEW SETTLEMENTS IN THE FUTURE, SHORT OF AN OUT-  
RIGHT COLLAPSE OF THE AUTONOMY PLAN. ON THE OTHER HAND,  
SHOULD CAMP DAVID FAIL TO PRODUCE THE BASIS FOR AN  
AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT - OR AT LEAST A CONTINUATION OF  
THE NEGOTIATIONS - WE CAN EXPECT ANOTHER QUICK BURST OF  
SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY ON THE WEST BANK. THE FIVE NEW  
JORDAN VALLEY SETTLEMENTS APPROVED BY THE MINISTERIAL

SETTLEMENTS COMMITTEE ON JUNE 28 (BUT, BECAUSE OF YADIN'S DISSENT, STILL LACKING FORMAL CABINET APPROVAL) ARE PROBABLY BEING HELD IN RESERVE FOR JUST SUCH AN EVENTUALITY.

11. A FORMAL MORATORIUM IS THUS THE MOST WE CAN HOPE FOR ON THE SETTLEMENTS ISSUE IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, AND THE CHANCES FOR EVEN THIS MUST BE RATED AT NO BETTER THAN 50-50 EVEN THOUGH THE POLLS HAVE CONSISTENTLY SHOWN THAT A MAJORITY OF THE ELECTORATE WOULD FAVOR SUCH A MEASURE WHILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE UNDERWAY, FROM WHICH PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF A HALT IN NEW SETTLEMENTS UNDER THE AUTONOMY PLAN CAN BE INFERRED.

12. OVER THE LONG TERM, COMPROMISE OVER THE NEW SETTLEMENTS IN THE SAMARIAN HIGHLANDS IS PROBABLY ALSO POSSIBLE. AS MENTIONED ABOVE, THESE SETTLEMENTS ARE ALL QUITE NEW AND HAVE SUNK VERY FEW ROOTS IN THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN SOIL. THE SETTLERS ARE ALL STILL HOUSED IN PREFABS AND NEARLY ALL DEPEND ON JOBS IN ISRAEL FOR THEIR LIVELIHOOD, IN  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 TEL AV 11128 03 OF 04 291105Z

CONTRAST TO THE RELATIVELY FLOURISHING AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIES OF THE JORDAN VALLEY SETTLEMENTS. EVEN IN THE CASE OF THE LATTER, HOWEVER, ECONOMICS WILL NOT BE A CRITICAL FACTOR. WHILE ENORMOUS BY ISRAELI STANDARDS, THE TOTAL INVESTMENT IN SETTLEMENTS IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES TO DATE IS WELL UNDER ONE BILLION DOLLARS; I.E. ABOUT HALF OF OUR ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO ISRAEL FOR ONE YEAR.

13. THE FATE OF THE SETTLEMENTS IS ALMOST INSEPARABLE FROM THE FINAL DISPOSITION OF THE TERRITORIES IN WHICH THEY ARE LOCATED BUT, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, WE BELIEVE IT IS THE LATTER WHICH WILL DETERMINE THE FORMER. THE PROSPECTS OF ISRAEL'S AGREEING TO FINAL BORDERS THAT WOULD RETURN MOST OF THE TERRITORY IN QUESTION TO NON-MILITARIZED ARAB CONTROL ARE, AT THIS POINT, EXCEEDINGLY DIM; BUT IF CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD CHANGE AND THE POLITICAL WILL TO WITHDRAW FROM MUCH OF THE WEST BANK BECOMES MANIFEST, THE EXISTENCE OF THE SETTLEMENTS IN AND OF THEMSELVES WOULD NOT PREVENT ISRAEL FROM DOING SO.

14. AS GENERALLY UNDERSTOOD BY THOSE WHO ADVOCATE IT, "TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE" ON THE WEST BANK MEANS WITHDRAWING FROM MOST OF THE HIGHLAND AREAS BUT RETAINING SOVEREIGN CONTROL OF A BROAD STRIP ALONG THE JORDAN VALLEY, EXCEPT FOR A CORRIDOR TO THE EAST BANK AROUND JERICHO. THE RATIONALE BEHIND THIS APPROACH IS THAT CONTROL OF THE JORDAN VALLEY WOULD PERMIT ISRAEL TO MONITOR INDEPENDENTLY THE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE WEST BANK AND TO REPEL ANY ATTEMPTED INVASION FROM JORDAN LONG BEFORE IT REACHED ISRAEL'S HEAVILY POPULATED CENTERS.

15. THE PERCEIVED ROLE OF THE SETTLEMENTS IN SECURING  
THIS OBJECTIVE IS, IN OUR VIEW, AN INDIRECT ONE. IN  
TACTICAL TERMS, THE EFFICACY OF CIVILIAN SETTLEMENTS IN  
PERFORMING MILITARY FUNCTIONS IS HIGHLY ARGUABLE. THE  
SETTLEMENTS ARE GENERALLY DESCRIBED AS CONTRIBUTING  
DIRECTLY TO THE TASKS OF DETERRING INFILTRATION, PROVIDING  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 TEL AV 11128 03 OF 04 291105Z

EARLY WARNING, AND REPELLING INVASION. THERE IS LITTLE  
EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, THAT ALL OF THESE FUNCTIONS COULD NOT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TEL AV 11128 04 OF 04 300147Z

ACTION NEA-07

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EUR-08 IO-06 SSM-01 NSCE-00  
INR-05 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 PM-03 DODE-00 SP-02 L-01  
H-01 PA-01 ACDA-10 SAA-01 SES-01 SSO-00 INRE-00  
/062 W

-----012258 300215Z /62/43

O 291208Z AUG 78

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5188

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

USMISSION SINAI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 TEL AVIV 11128

LIMDIS



CORRECTED COPY FOR PARA SIXTEEN LINE 11 AND 12

BE PERFORMED JUST AS WELL BY REGULAR UNIFORMED MILITARY PERSONNEL, BASED IN CONVENTIONAL MILITARY CAMPS. IN FACT, WHEN IT COMES TO THE LAST OF THESE FUNCTIONS, REPELLING AGGRESSION, THERE ARE SOME ISRAELI MILITARY MEN WHO CON- TEND THAT SETTLEMENTS ARE NOT ONLY NOT HELPFUL, THEY MAY BE AN ACTUAL HINDRANCE. AS SHOWN ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS IN 1973, THE SETTLEMENTS ARE INCAPABLE OF DEFENDING THEM- SELVES AGAINST AN INVADING ARMY AND MAY REQUIRE THE DIVER- CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TEL AV 11128 04 OF 04 300147Z

SION OF FORCES TO DEFEND THEM THAT ARE NEEDED FOR THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE. MOREOVER, FOR EARLY-WARNING PURPOSES, SETTLEMENTS IN THE JORDAN VALLEY, BECAUSE OF THEIR SUB- SEA-LEVEL LOCATION, ARE ALL BUT USELESS.

16. IN PSYCHOLOGICAL TERMS, THE SETTLEMENTS SYMBOLIZE TO ISRAEL'S OWN PEOPLE AND TO THE WORLD THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE GOI'S INTENT TO RETAIN A COMMANDING PRESENCE IN THE TERRITORIES. THE REACTION OF THE AVERAGE ISRAELI TO THE UNPRECEDENTED SIGHT OF AN ISRAELI SETTLEMENT BEING DIS- MANTLED IS LIABLE TO BE INITIALLY TRAUMATIC. SOME MILI- TARY MEN HAVE TOLD US EXPLICITLY THAT THE PRESENCE OF ISRAELI CIVILIANS IN THE JORDAN VALLEY, THE GOLAN AND ELSEWHERE GREATLY INCREASES PRESSURE ON THE GOVERNMENT NOT TO GIVE IN TO EXTERNAL PRESSURES TO WITHDRAW FROM THOSE TERRITORIES AND THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE PEOPLE WHO LIVE IN THE SETTLEMENTS AND THE ORGANIZATIONS THAT SUPPORT THEM, MOST OF WHICH ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE SO- CIALIST END OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM, CONSTITUTE A FOR- MIDABLE PRO-SETTLEMENT LOBBY. THEY ARE ALSO SEEN TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE MORALE OF TROOPS STATIONED IN THESE INHOSPITABLE AREAS BY GIVING THEM "SOMETHING TO FIGHT FOR" IF NECESSARY. BUT THE CONTRIBUTION OF THESE FACTORS TO ISRAEL'S SECURITY TERMS ARE ALL SECONDARY.

17. IF THEY HAD THEIR DRUTHERS, MOST ISRAELI MILITARY PLANNERS WOULD OBVIOUSLY PREFER TO RETAIN CONTROL OF THE CENTRAL SPINE OF THE WEST BANK. BUT THE PRESENCE OF A LARGE NUMBER OF ARABS IN THAT REGION CARRIES POLITICAL LIABILITIES WHICH THE MAJORITY OF ISRAELIS RECOGNIZE AS UNACCEPTABLE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT WOULD MAKE SUCH A CONCESSION EVEN MORE TOLERABLE. WHAT IS REALLY ESSENTIAL IN SECURITY TERMS IS THE MAIN- CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 TEL AV 11128 04 OF 04 300147Z

TENANCE OF AN ESTABLISHED MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE JORDAN VALLEY AND ITS ADJACENT FOOTHILLS AND ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS (WITH A BUFFER ZONE THE WIDTH OF A DEMILITARIZED SINAI PENINSULA, THE ARGUMENTS FOR A PERMANENT ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE RAFAH APPROACHES ARE LESS PERSUASIVE), RATHER THAN THE SETTLEMENTS IN THOSE AREAS PER SE. IT IS ON THAT ISSUE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD FOCUS SHOULD "TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE" EVENTUALLY MAKE IT ONTO THE AGENDA. IF ISRAEL ENDS UP RETAINING PERMANENT CONTROL OF PARTS OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, THE ISSUE OF SETTLEMENTS IN THOSE AREAS BECOMES MOOT. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF ISRAEL SHOULD ULTIMATELY AGREE TO WITHDRAW FROM MOST OF THE WEST BANK HIGHLANDS, THE ARGUMENT OVER SETTLEMENTS IN THAT REGION WILL NOT HINGE ON THE NOTION OF SECURITY, BUT ON THE RIGHT OF JEWS TO LIVE ANYWHERE IN ERETZ YISRAEL. ONCE THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE PROCEEDED THAT FAR IN THE DIRECTION OF COMPROMISE, WE BELIEVE THAT AN ARRANGEMENT COULD PROBABLY BE WORKED OUT UNDER WHICH SOME SYMBOLIC JEWISH SETTLEMENTS WILL BE PERMITTED TO REMAIN -- PERHAPS AT PARTICULARLY HOLY OR HISTORIC SITES SUCH AS GUSH ETZION -- WHILE OTHERS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN.  
HART

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** LAND SETTLEMENT, WEST BANK, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS, PEACE PLANS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 29 aug 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978TELAV11128  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D780352-0579  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** TEL AVIV  
**Handling Restrictions:**  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t19780811/aaaaajbo.tel  
**Line Count:** 517  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** 37a81759-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION NEA  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 10  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** LIMDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 13 jun 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 1569041  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** ISRAEL'S SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK: HOW MUCH GIVE IS THERE?  
**TAGS:** PBOR, PDEV, MOPS, PINR, IS  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/37a81759-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014